The Clash of Civilizations? Statistical Evidence from Armed Conflicts, 1989-2015 by Che, Afa\u27anwi M.
Peace and Conflict Studies
Volume 26 | Number 1 Article 5
5-2019
The Clash of Civilizations? Statistical Evidence
from Armed Conflicts, 1989-2015
Afa'anwi M. Che
Kampala International University, afanwiche@yahoo.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs
Part of the International Relations Commons, and the Peace and Conflict Studies Commons
This Article has supplementary content. View the full record on NSUWorks here:
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol26/iss1/5
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CAHSS
Journals at NSUWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Peace and
Conflict Studies by an authorized editor of NSUWorks. For more
information, please contact nsuworks@nova.edu.
Recommended Citation
Che, Afa'anwi M. (2019) "The Clash of Civilizations? Statistical Evidence from Armed Conflicts, 1989-2015," Peace and Conflict
Studies: Vol. 26 : No. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol26/iss1/5
The Clash of Civilizations? Statistical Evidence from Armed Conflicts,
1989-2015
Abstract
Do armed conflicts in the contemporary post-Cold War period reflect a clash of civilizations (CoC) as
predicted by Samuel Huntington? This study substantially broadens and temporally extends the scope of
major extant quantitative tests of the CoC thesis by assessing not only interactions among states but also
interactions between states and non-state armed groups, from 1989 to 2015. Based on Chi-square and logistic
regression tests, this study does not find empirical support for the CoC thesis as a basis for adopting foreign
policies of civilizational containment.
Keywords: clash of civilizations, Samuel Huntington, armed conflict
Author Bio(s)
Afa’anwi Ma’abo Che is a winner of Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies -
China Africa Research Initiative (SAIS-CARI) research fellowship for 2019. He holds a Ph.D in Politics (with
specialization in International Relations) from Swansea University, UK. Che is the Deputy Director of
Postgraduate Studies and a Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Peace Studies at Kampala
International University (KIU), Uganda. He has previously served as a teaching fellow at Swansea University,
UK and as a lecturer, Director of Research, and Dean of Student Affairs at Kwararafa University, Nigeria. He
regularly contributes to coding data on several African states for the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Index,
the world’s largest democracy measurement project.
This article is available in Peace and Conflict Studies: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol26/iss1/5
The Clash of Civilizations? Statistical Evidence from Armed Conflicts, 1989-2015 
Afa’anwi M. Che 
 
The recent surge in suspected Islamist terror incidents in the West and America’s 
temporary restriction on immigration from some largely Islamic states have revitalized 
Huntington’s (1993) famous clash of civilizations prediction 25 years ago. But is the world really 
experiencing a clash of civilizations (CoC) following the end of the Cold War? While a 
quantitative evaluative design allows for a comprehensive test of Huntington’s CoC thesis, major 
extant quantitative evaluations are temporally and substantially flawed, failing to effectively 
assess the clash thesis on its own terms. Huntington’s clash thesis (1993; 1996) predicted that 
ideological antipathies of the Cold War period will, in the contemporary post-Cold War period, 
be supplanted by cultural conflicts, which at the broadest level are civilizational conflicts. 
Conflicts of contemporary global politics will mainly be between nation-states and groups of 
different civilizations (1993, p. 22), and these intercivilizational conflicts will be more frequent 
and violent than conflicts within the same civilization (1993, p. 48).  
          While Huntington predicted the clash of civilizations to take place in the post-Cold War 
period and to occur predominantly between states and groups (non-state actors), prominent 
extant quantitative evaluations do not extensively cover the contemporary era and test the 
validity of the CoC thesis mainly from relationships between states. For instance, Russett, Oneal 
and Cox (2000) undertook one of the most prominent assessments at the dawn of the 21st 
century, but their test covered a period (1950-1992) that is almost entirely related to the Cold 
War and sought to establish if states belonging to different civilizations were more likely to 
engage in militarized disputes with each other than states belonging to the same civilization. 
Russet, Oneal, and Cox (2000) did not find evidence linking civizational difference and 
militarized interstate disputes.  
          In A Reply to Russett, Oneal & Cox, Huntington (2000) rebuffed the quantitative analysts’ 
claim that their assessment of militarized interstate disputes between 1950 and 1992 provided a 
test of the clash thesis: “It does nothing of the kind, and the claim that it does is simply 
untrue…an analysis of conflicts during the Cold War can neither prove nor disprove” the CoC 
thesis (p. 609). Furthermore, Huntington criticized Russett, Oneal, and Cox’s (2000) test dataset 
for covering “only interstate conflicts” which are “very few” in the post-Cold War period and are 
largely outnumbered by conflicts between states on one side and (non-state) armed groups on the 
other (p. 609). Huntington concluded his critique by calling on Russett, Oneal, and Cox to rerun 
their assessment with a revised design focusing on the post-Cold War period and incorporating 
conflicts involving non-state actors. In a separate article, Oneal and Russett (2000) reacted to 
Huntington’s critique with a qualitative justification for the Russett, Oneal, and Cox (2000) 
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interstate conflict—and Cold War era-related—test dataset but did not undertake Huntington’s 
challenge for a revised, more comprehensive test of the CoC thesis.  
          Subsequent major large-n evaluations, including Henderson and Tucker (2001), Chiozza 
(2002), and Imai (2006), generally echo Russett, Oneal, and Cox’s finding of no statistically 
significant evidence for the CoC thesis, but critically fail to cover the post-Cold War period 
extensively and continue to test for intercivilizational belligerence mainly from relationships 
between states, possibly owing to a relative dearth of data on non-state actors. The resurgence of 
suspected Islamist terrorism in the West on the eve of the 25th anniversary of Huntington’s CoC 
article presents a timely opportunity to re-evaluate the clash thesis more closely on its own terms. 
This article assesses the CoC thesis over almost the entire post-Cold War period (1989-2015) 
whilst gauging intercivilizational belligerence (or the absence thereof) from all dyadic armed 
conflicts, including extra systemic, interstate, intrastate, and internationalized intrastate conflicts, 
in which at least one of the primary sides is a state.  
           Based on two measurements (one geographically bound and the other non-geographically 
bound) of civilizational similarity within dyads, preliminary descriptive frequency statistics 
herein reveal that the number of intercivilizational conflicts in 2015 was slightly higher than in 
1989 while the number of intracivilizational conflicts in 2015 was relatively lower. While the 
comparative frequency counts seem to suggest that intercivilizational conflicts have increased 
over time in line with Huntington’s prediction, a closer observation of the entire period in-
between 1989 and 2015 reveals volatile surges and dips in the distribution of inter- and 
intracivilizational conflicts across time.  
          Further analysis involving two logistic regression models controlling for some traditional 
realist and liberal conflict influences do not find statistically significant evidence linking 
civilizational difference and increased likelihood of armed conflict among states and between 
states and groups or non-state actors, corroborating extant quantitative evidence against 
Huntington’s clash thesis as a basis for foreign policies of cultural containment. 
          This article proceeds in three sections: first, counterfactual testable hypotheses are derived 
from a brief review of Huntington’s reasons as to why civilizations are expected to clash; next, a 
quantitative evaluative design is described; and finally, statistical outputs of the evaluation are 
reported together with their policy implication. 
Rethinking Huntington’s Thesis: Why Civilizations Will Not Clash 
Huntington (1993; 1996) predicted that civilizations will clash in the post-Cold War 
period remarkably as a function of various factors, notably including identity differences 
between civilizations, increased interactions between civilizations resulting from globalization, 
and resistance to “Westernization” of other civilizations. This section reviews these factors and 
avers a counterfactual hypothesis to the clash thesis.  
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Identity Differences  
          According to Huntington (1993), civilizations are expected to clash primarily because of 
“differences among civilizations” with regard to ascriptive identifiers as language, tradition, and 
religion (p. 25). These differences are “real,” “basic,” “fundamental,” and “have generated the 
most prolonged and most violent conflicts” (p. 25). Huntington clearly makes a direct link 
between cultural identity difference and conflict outbreak. However, such a primordialist linkage 
is overly simplistic, treating hospitality and cooperation within the in-group and hostility and 
conflict against the out-group as a mere function of “common blood” (Vanhanen, 1999) and 
myths of own group virtuousness and superiority (Hammond & Axelrod, 2006, p. 926). 
Huntington’s primordialist conception of cultural identity is trumped by the more convincing 
instrumentalist perception that views the effect of cultural identity on conflict as indirect rather 
than direct: intercultural conflicts arise only when identities are politicized or manipulated for 
exclusionary political and socio-economic benefits. Thus, differences in the identities of 
civilizations are unlikely to produce conflicts except in circumstances where the identities are 
politicized (Gurr, 1994; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).  
          More critically, even if Huntington’s primordialist perception linking mere differences in 
cultural identity and intercivilizational conflicts were to be accepted as correct, then one can 
logically expect more clashes within, not between, civilizations because there are more levels of 
identity differences within, than between, civilizations. As clarified in Huntington’s (1993) own 
work, a civilization is the broadest level of cultural identity short of that which differentiates 
humans from other species and there are only “seven or eight” civilizations in the world (p. 24). 
Conversely, within each civilization, a group could culturally identify itself in several ways 
according to its village, district, region, country, and continent of location or origin. Thus, if 
cultural identity differences were actually a direct source of clashes as Huntington asserts, then 
there should be more conflicts between entities within civilizations than between civilizations. 
Increased Interactions 
          Globalization in the post-Cold War period, according to Huntington (1993), has stirred a 
surge in interactions between peoples of different civilizations, intensifying “awareness of 
differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations,” and engendering 
conflicts between, and peace within, civilizations (p. 25). However, the asserted linkage between 
globalization and intercivilizational conflicts is undermined by the empirically stronger 
commercial peace theory, which anticipates that increased interactions and movements of 
people, investments, capital, and goods accompanying globalization will reduce mistrust and 
increase interdependency, ultimately mitigating conflicts between civilizations. Indeed, as 
national economies become more globalized, and as major powers such as the U.S. and UK exit 
regional institutions such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the EU 
while seeking global partnerships, the world is more likely to see intercivilizational cooperation 
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while disgruntlement within regional organizations and partnerships being “Brexited” are likely 
to fuel intracivilizational conflicts. 
Resistance to Westernization 
          Huntington’s (1993) thesis prominently argues that, following the end of the Cold War, 
“efforts of the West to promote its values of democracy and liberalism as universal values” will 
engender resistance from other civilizations and spur clashes between “the West and the Rest,” 
especially between the West and the Muslim world (p. 29). Huntington’s thesis perceives 
Western liberal democracy to be particularly inimical to Islam because it challenges the 
sovereignty of God and God’s law (the Shari’a) by projecting the electorate and the legislature as 
sovereign sources of authority. However, the internationalization of Islamic economies is 
accompanied by effective democratization of Islamic polities, with the recent “Arab Spring” 
protests for democracy and the increase in the number of democracies in the Arab and entire 
non-Western world since the end of the Cold War (Salih, 2001, p. 4) challenging the supposed 
incompatibility of democracy and Islam. Even when the former Gaddafi regime of Libya 
mounted repressive operations against the popular protests, some other Arab states partnered 
with NATO members to intervene, with the stated aim of protecting civilians. Such a partnership 
bears testament to shared values of democracy and liberalism between the West and the Muslim 
world (Che, 2013).  
          Several suspected Islamist terror incidents in the West, including the ones mentioned 
earlier, and America’s war on terror, together with President Trump’s anti-Muslim immigration 
executive orders, have been cited as evidence of a clash of civilizations between the West and 
the Muslim world (Cohen, 2015). The proposed evidence is not quite convincing, however, as 
Islamic states hosting America’s “war on terror” and/or being targeted by President Trump’s 
immigration-restrictive executive orders constitute only a minority of the Muslim world, as not 
all Muslims, even in Islamic states targeted by the U.S., hold extremist Islamist views. Moreover, 
suspected ISIS and Al-Qaeda attacks have in recent years targeted not only Western cities but 
also cities in the Islamic world itself, including Baghdad, Tripoli, and Damascus, killing “fellow 
Muslims” and bomb-blasting even mosques.  
          Counterfactual arguments against Huntington’s CoC thesis suggest the following counter-
hypothesis: 
Armed conflicts in the contemporary post-Cold War era are more likely within 
civilizations than would be predicted by geographical contiguity and other conventional 
determinants of armed conflicts.  
Research Design 
To test the clash thesis, observations of armed conflicts are made annually for every 
armed conflict dyad in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s dyadic dataset, version 1-2016 
(Melander, Pettersson, & Themnér, 2016) over the active years of each dyad across the post-
Cold War period 1989-2015. Comparative frequency counts of intercivilizational and 
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intracivilizational conflict dyad-years are executed via the Chi-square crosstabs procedure on the 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) to find preliminary evidence for or against the 
clash thesis. To further evaluate the influence of civilizational identity difference on dyadic 
armed conflicts, this study uses logistic regression analysis controlling for traditional realist 
(geographic contiguity, military capability, and military support) and liberal (level of democracy) 
variables predicting armed conflict. 
Dependent Variable  
          The dependent variable in this study (CONFLICT) is dichotomous and relates to the 
presence or absence of a dyadic armed conflict involving a state on the one side and another state 
or a non-state actor on the opposing side, and in which the use of armed force results in at least 
twenty-five (25) battle-related deaths in a calendar year. This understanding of armed conflict 
allows for a test of the clash thesis not only from interactions exclusively involving states as with 
most extant evaluations, but also from relationships involving non-state actors. The twenty-five 
(25) battle-related deaths threshold might imply an exclusion of several possible 
intercivilizational militarized disputes involving threats, displays, and uses of military force that 
do not result in twenty-five (25) deaths. However, it allows the clash thesis to be tested more 
closely on Huntington’s own terms which forecast that, violent conflicts between “states and 
groups of different civilizations” are likely to be severe and to escalate “as other states and 
groups from these civilizations rally to the support of their ‘kin countries’” (Huntington, 1996,  
p. 28; see also Russett, Oneal, & Cox, 2000, p. 591). Moreover, the relative scarcity of data on 
militarized disputes merely involving threats and displays of military force for the period under 
study, and for relationships involving non-state actors, makes it impossible to incorporate such 
disputes in this study.  
          The Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) dyadic dataset uses the twenty-five (25) 
battle-related deaths threshold and covers various types of armed conflicts (extra systemic, 
interstate, intrastate, and internationalized intrastate conflicts) in which at least one of the dyadic 
parties is a state. Thus, the UCDP dyadic dataset (version 1-2016) is used to code the dependent 
variable for all active years of each dyad across the post-Cold War period under study. Herein, 
the active interval of a conflict dyad starts from the year in which the dyad first recorded twenty-
five (25) battle-related deaths and ends when it last recorded that threshold. Years outside the 
active interval but falling within the 1989-2015 post-Cold War scope of study, are excluded from 
the analysis. This is to ensure that the non-state actors included in the analysis were actually in 
existence for the dyad-years coded, assuring accuracy of the analysis. To illustrate, Senegal vs. 
Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) with dyad ID 129 in the UCDP dyadic 
dataset was seen within the post-Cold War period to be active only from 1990 to 2011. Thus 
1989 and the post-2011 years are not coded for this dyad and are excluded from analysis. If a 
dyad registered at least twenty-five (25) battle-related deaths in an active year, the dependent 
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variable, CONFLICT, is coded ‘1’ to indicate the presence of armed conflict; if it did not, it is 
coded ‘0’ to indicate an absence of armed conflict. 
Independent Variable 
          Difference, or the absence thereof, in the civilization identities of the component entities of 
the dyads in the UCDP dyadic dataset constitutes the predictor variable in this study. Civilization 
identity difference is measured in two ways, with the second measure allowing the study to test 
the robustness of empirical findings associated with the first measure. First, Huntington’s (1996, 
pp. 45-48, Map 1.3) geographically bound conception and classification of major civilizations is 
used to identify the civilization membership of states and non-state actors, allowing for an 
evaluation of the clash thesis through Huntington’s own lenses. To minimize the possibility of 
missing civilization identity data for states which do not fall under any of the civilizations 
identified by Huntington (e.g., Israel and Jamaica), the Huntington-based measure of civilization 
difference (CIVDIF) draws on Henderson and Tucker (2001) as a complementary data source. 
Henderson and Tucker (2001, p. 325) list such states under a residual civilization category 
known as “Other.” 
          Under the CIVDIF measure, the civilization identities of armed groups in extra systemic, 
intrastate, and internationalized intrastate conflict dyads are generally considered in this study to 
be the same as the identities of the countries within which they are located, given Huntington’s 
geographically bound conception of civilizations. The UCDP Actor Dataset (version 2.2-2016) 
compiled and updated by Pettersson (2014) is used to determine the country location of non-state 
actors per conflict dyad in the UCDP dyadic dataset. CIVDIF is coded ‘1’ for all active dyad-
years wherein the rival entities in the dyad belong to different civilizations, and ‘0’ where the 
dyadic entities belong to the same civilization. 
          However, the CIVDIF measure, though ensuring that the clash thesis is tested as closely as 
possible on Huntington’s own terms, predisposes most conflict dyads to being coded as 
intracivilizational since a majority of post-Cold War conflicts are intrastate conflicts. More 
critically, coding intrastate conflict dyads as intracivilizational dyads potentially disregards the 
influence of core cultural identity disputes in some intrastate and internationalized intrastate 
conflicts. Component entities of some intrastate and internationalized intrastate conflict dyads do 
not perceive each other as sharing the same cultural identity, irrespective of Huntington’s 
geographically bound conception and classification of civilizations.  
          Examples of intrastate conflict dyads coded under CIVDIF as intracivilizational but 
characterized by perceived core cultural identity differences and disputes include: Algeria vs. 
Islamic Salvation Army (UCDP Dyad ID 1); Algeria vs. Armed Islamic Group (ID 3); Egypt vs. 
Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya (ID 241); Afghanistan vs. Taliban (ID 327); Afghanistan vs. Hezb-i-
Islami (ID 412); (Pakistan vs. Mohajir Quami Movement (ID 340); Iraq vs. Al-Mahdi Army (ID 
442); Iraq vs. Ansar Al-Islam (ID 443); Iraq vs. IS (ID 448); Nigeria vs. Boko Haram (ID 793); 
and Syria vs. IS (ID 14620). While all of the listed dyads are coded under CIVDIF as (Islamic) 
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intracivilizational dyads, the sub-state groups in the dyads actually perceive(d) and project(ed) 
the governments of their dyadic adversaries as being “Western” and secular since those 
governments usually align with and are supported by Western powers, particularly the USA. On 
the other hand, the government sides in the listed dyads perceive(d) and project(ed) their dyadic 
adversaries as extremists on diversity-intolerant “jihadist” missions. 
          Because some intrastate and internationalized intrastate conflict dyads might be 
characterized by core cultural identity differences and disputes, regardless of Huntington’s 
classification of civilizations, core cultural identity (CORECUL) is constructed as a second 
measure of the independent variable to test the robustness of empirical findings associated with 
the CIVDIF measure. Drawing mainly on Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan’s (2013) Non-
State Actors in Armed Conflict (NSA) Dataset, which provides detailed information and 
narratives on civil and internationalized civil conflict dyads in the UCDP dyadic dataset, 
CORECUL is coded ‘1’ if at least one dyadic side perceived and projected the other as being 
culturally different, with cultural identity being a fault line in the dyad, and ‘0’ otherwise. This 
coding operationalization is based on the “weak link” assumption, which asserts that the 
belligerent character of dyadic interactions is often determined by the side with fewer constraints 
(Oneal & Russett, 1997; also cited in Chiozza, 2002, p. 722). In this context, the less constrained 
side is expected to be the one that projects itself as being culturally different (e.g., Islamic 
Salvation Army in Algeria, Taliban in Afghanistan, Al-Mahdi Army in Iraq, and Boko Haram in 
Nigeria) from the other dyadic side, with a motivation to militarily challenge the other side.    
Control Variables 
         Three realism-based variables (geographical contiguity, national capacity, and third-party 
military support) and one liberalism-based factor (level of democracy) that are among key 
conventional determinants of armed conflict are added to the baseline regression models.  
         First, given that civilizations are geographically bound in Huntington’s conception and that 
most conflicts are between contiguous actors, the empirical evaluation of the clash thesis controls 
for geographical contiguity between the component entities of each dyad. Geographical 
contiguity provides a potential for members of a dyad to reach each other with military force. 
Moreover, contiguous actors are likely to have the most reasons to fight, including over 
territorial control, natural resources, political power, secessionist and irredentist nationalism, and 
so forth. Thus, geographical contiguity provides both the opportunity and incentives to fight. The 
study draws mainly on the Correlates of War (COW) project’s territorial contiguity data 
(Stinnett, Tir, Schafer, Diehl, & Gochmanet, 2002) and on state–rebel conflict dyad narratives in 
Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan’s (2013) NSA dataset to gauge geographical contiguity 
(GEOCON). GEOCON is coded ‘1’ if both dyadic entities are directly contiguous, with one 
being a component part of the other (as in most civil conflict dyads) or with both entities sharing 
a land and/or sea border, and ‘0’ otherwise. 
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          Second, because the national material (including military) capacities of states to exercise 
and resist pressure or influence in relations with other states and non-state actors may increase 
incentives and opportunities for armed conflicts, this study controls for national capacities in all 
post-Cold War conflict dyad-years. The COW project’s index of national material capabilities, 
version 5.0 (Greig & Enterline, 2017)—which uses diverse (demographic, industrial, and 
military) component indicators—is employed to gauge national capacity, NACAPH, with higher 
values expected to correlate with greater armed conflict propensity. For dyads exclusively 
composed of states (interstate dyads), the greater of the two states’ NACAPH values is used. This 
is consistent with the aforementioned “weak link” assumption in conflict studies. In terms of the 
reasoning linking national capacity and armed conflict, the state expected to be less constrained 
is the state with a higher NACAPH value.  
          The third control variable reflects the realist expectation that, third party military support 
to at least one side in a dyad is likely to boost motivation and opportunities for armed conflict, 
irrespective of the civilizational character of the dyad. Third party military support is added to 
the baseline regression models using the variable name MILSUP which equals ‘1’ if one or both 
members of a dyad had military support from other states and/or non-state actors, and ‘0’ if 
neither dyadic side had military support. Observations for the presence or absence of third-party 
military support in the dyad were made from the UCDP dyadic dataset itself and Cunningham, 
Gleditsch, and Salehyan’s (2009) Non-State Actor Data (version 3.4) which draws on the UCDP 
to expand information on non-state actors involved in civil conflicts, including information about 
external support to armed groups. 
         Under liberalism, democracy is seen to enjoy an almost unrivalled, though not undisputed, 
peace-inducing effect arising from its institutional and cultural constraints on state leaders 
(Russett, 1995). Accordingly, it is to be expected that, regardless of the civilizational identities of 
their component entities, dyads with higher levels of democracy would be less prone to armed 
conflicts than dyads with lower levels of democracy. This study uses Polity IV data, v.2015 
(Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2016) to code level of democracy, DEMOCRACYL, in contemporary 
conflict dyad-years. Based on three component indicators of the political character of regimes 
(popular participation, openness of executive recruitment, and executive constraints), the 
composite Polity index measures democracy on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (most 
autocratic) to +10 (most democratic). Owing to the absence of data measuring democracy in non-
state actors, DEMOCRACYL scores for all dyad-years in this study are derived exclusively from 
those of state members of every dyad. The democratic character of dyads exclusively composed 
of states (interstate dyads) is measured by the lesser of the two states’ polity scores as the state 
with the lower score constitutes the ‘weak link’ in the dyad, with fewer constraints on its foreign 
policy.  
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Statistical Outputs 
Preliminary descriptive statistical analysis involving comparative frequency counts of 
dyadic conflicts within and between civilizations via the Chi-square crosstabs procedure on 
SPSS reveal evidence that contradicts Huntington’s clash thesis and supports the counter-
hypothesis stated earlier. As reported in Table 1, of all the dyad-years coded (N = 1765), 1378 
were plagued by armed conflicts. The proportion of intracivilizational dyad-years that witnessed 
armed conflicts (1283; that is, 93.1 percent of 1378) was considerably greater than the number of 
intercivilizational dyad-years that experienced armed conflicts (95; 6.9 percent) using 
Huntington’s geographically bound operationalization of civilization difference (CIVDIF). When 
the independent variable was coded in terms of the presence or absence of core cultural 
differences within dyads irrespective of geographical (non)contiguity (CORECUL), more 
intercivilizational dyad-years were observed to have witnessed armed conflicts (828, that is, 60.1 
percent of 1378), relative to intracivilizational ones (550; 39.9 percent), as reported in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 1  
Observed frequencies of UCDP dyadic conflicts within and between civilizations                
(1989 – 2015), based on the CIVDIF measure of civilizational difference 
 
 CONFLICT      Total 
0 Absence of 
armed conflict 
  1 Incidence of    
armed conflict 
CIVDIF 
0 Side A and Side B belong 
to the same civilization 
Count 348 1283 1631 
% within CIVDIF 21.3% 78.7% 100.0% 
% within CONFLICT 89.9% 93.1% 92.4% 
% of Total 19.7% 72.7% 92.4% 
1 Side A and Side B belong 
to different civilizations 
Count 39 95 134 
% within CIVDIF 29.1% 70.9% 100.0% 
% within CONFLICT 10.1% 6.9% 7.6% 
% of Total 2.2% 5.4% 7.6% 
 Total 
  Count 387 1378 1765 
% within CIVDIF 21.9% 78.1% 100.0% 
% within CONFLICT 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 21.9% 78.1% 100.0% 
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Table 2 
Observed frequencies of UCDP dyadic conflicts within and between civilizations               
(1989 – 2015), based on the CORECUL measure of civilizational difference 
 
 CONFLICT Total 
0 Absence of 
armed conflict 
1 Incidence of 
armed conflict 
CORECUL 
0 absence of core cultural 
dispute between side A and 
side B 
Count 135 550 685 
% within CORECUL 19.7% 80.3% 100.0% 
% within CONFLICT 34.9% 39.9% 38.8% 
% of Total 7.6% 31.2% 38.8% 
1 Presence of core cultural 
dispute between side A and 
side B 
Count 252 828 1080 
% within CORECUL 23.3% 76.7% 100.0% 
% within CONFLICT 65.1% 60.1% 61.2% 
% of Total 14.3% 46.9% 61.2% 
Total 
Count 387 1378 1765 
% within CORECUL 21.9% 78.1% 100.0% 
% within CONFLICT 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 21.9% 78.1% 100.0% 
  
In terms of the distribution of intercivilizational conflicts over the post-Cold War period 
studied, frequency counts based on the CIVDIF measure of civilizational difference indicate that 
there were two intercivilizational dyad-year armed conflicts in 1989 and by 2015 the number had 
increased slightly to ten, while the number of intracivilizational conflicts dropped marginally 
from 58 in 1989, to 50 in 2015 (see Table 3). Frequency counts based on the CORECUL measure 
of civilizational difference reveal a similar pattern, with intercivilizational conflicts rising from 
22 in 1989, to 46 in 2015, whereas intracivilizational conflicts dropped from 38 in 1989, to 14 in 
2015 (see Table 3). While the comparative frequency counts of inter- and intracivilizational 
conflicts for the start (1989) and end (2015) years of the period studied might appear to suggest 
that intercivilizational conflicts have increased over time in line with Huntington’s prediction, a 
closer observation of the entire period in-between 1989 and 2015 reveals volatility in the 
distribution of inter- and intracivilizational conflicts as graphically illustrated with line charts 
below Table 3.  
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Table 3  
Distribution of UCDP Dyadic Armed Conflicts over the Post-Cold War Period, 1989 – 2015  
Dyad-
Year 
Number of 
Intercivilizational 
Conflicts based 
on CIVDIF 
Measure of 
Civilizational 
Difference 
Number of 
Intracivilizational 
Conflicts based 
on CIVDIF 
Measure of 
Civilizational 
Difference 
Number of 
Intercivilizational 
Conflicts based 
on CORECUL 
Measure of 
Civilizational 
Difference 
Number of 
Intracivilizational 
Conflicts based 
on CORECUL 
Measure of 
Civilizational 
Difference 
1989 2 58 22 38 
1990 2 63 30 35 
1991 4 63 32 35 
1992 5 56 35 26 
1993 7 47 31 23 
1994 4 54 37 21 
1995 1 45 31 15 
1996 3 47 29 21 
1997 3 52 26 29 
1998 4 48 23 29 
1999 3 47 25 25 
2000 2 49 28 23 
2001 4 47 31 20 
2002 3 42 25 20 
2003 4 40 26 18 
2004 3 42 28 17 
2005 3 37 27 13 
2006 3 44 31 16 
2007 2 42 32 12 
2008 4 44 33 15 
2009 3 44 32 15 
2010 1 39 27 13 
2011 3 49 34 18 
2012 5 37 33 9 
2013 2 48 35 15 
2014 5 49 39 15 
2015 10 50 46 14 
Total 95 1283 828 550 
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Figure 1. Illustration of volatility in the distribution of UCDP armed conflicts from 1989 to 
2015, based on the CIVDIF measure of civilizational difference. 
 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of volatility in the distribution of UCDP armed Conflicts from 1989 to 
2015, based on the CORECUL measure of civilizational difference 
    
          As illustrated in Figure 1, observations based on the CIVDIF measure of civilizational 
difference indicate dips in the number of intercivilizational dyad-year conflicts over the periods 
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1993-1995, 1998-2000, 2003-2004, 2006-2007, 2008-2010, and 2012-2013. Rather than a steady 
decrease in the number of intracivilizational dyad-year conflicts as anticipated by the clash 
thesis, observations reveal surges over the periods 1989-1990, 1993-1994, 1995-1997, 1999-
2000, 2003-2004, 2005-2006, 2007-2008, 2010-2011, and 2012-2015. Volatility in the numbers 
of intercivilizational and intracivilizational conflicts become even more pronounced when the 
CORECUL measure of civilizational difference is used (Figure 2). 
           Chi-square tests for independence or relatedness between civilization difference and 
armed conflicts in Table 4 (based on the CIVDIF measure of civilizational difference) below 
suggest a statistically significant relationship as the “continuity correction” value (3.92) 
rectifying an overestimation of the Pearson Chi-square value for a 2 by 2 crosstabulation has a 
significance level (0.048) that is approximately equal to the commonly-used alpha value for 
statistical significance (0.05). Civilization difference appears to be negatively related to armed 
conflict propensity, with dyads composed of entities belonging to different civilizations being 
less likely to engage in armed conflicts than dyads composed of entities belonging to the same 
civilization. However, using the CORECUL measure of civilizational difference, Chi-square tests 
revealed no statistically significant relationship between civilizational difference and armed 
conflict propensity, p > 0.05 (see Table 5), suggesting yet again lack of empirical support for 
Huntington’s positive correlation between civilization difference and increased conflict 
likelihood. 
 
Table 4 
Chi-square tests for relatedness between civilization difference and incidence of armed conflict, 
based on the CIVDIF measure of civilization difference 
 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-square 4.365a 1 .037   
Continuity Correctionb 3.923 1 .048   
Likelihood Ratio 4.099 1 .043   
Fisher's Exact Test    .039 .026 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
4.362 1 .037 
  
N of Valid Cases 1765     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 29.38. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 5 
Chi-square tests for relatedness between civilization difference and incidence of armed 
conflict, based on the CORECUL measure of civilization difference 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.218a 1 .073   
Continuity Correctionb 3.010 1 .083   
Likelihood Ratio 3.250 1 .071   
Fisher's Exact Test    .077 .041 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
3.216 1 .073 
  
N of Valid Cases 1765     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 150.20. 
 b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
  
Nonetheless, simple bivariate statistics cannot be relied upon for conclusive remarks 
regarding the effect of civilization difference on armed conflicts. Non-multivariate test models 
controlling for potential realist and liberal conflict-mitigating factors are imperative. Thus, two 
logistic regression models incorporating four control variables each (geographical contiguity, 
national capacity, military support, and level of democracy) were used to verify the influence of 
civilizational difference on armed conflict. The first logistic regression model (Model 1) adopted 
Huntington’s geographically bound operationalization of civilizations (CIVDIF) to ensure a test 
of the clash thesis on its own terms. The second model (Model 2) checked the robustness of 
findings in Model 1 by adopting a non-geographically bound operationalization of civilizations 
which measures civilizational similarity within a dyad, or the absence thereof, in terms of 
whether at least one dyadic side perceives the other as sharing the same core cultural identity 
(CORECUL). 
          As shown in Table 6, Model 1 was statistically significant, χ2 (5, N = 1765) = 80.403,       
p < 0.05, indicating that the model was able to distinguish between dyad-years that experienced 
armed conflicts and those that did not.  
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Table 6 
Omnibus Tests of Model 1 Coefficients 
    Chi-
square 
              
df 
          
Sig. 
Step 1 
Step 80.403 5 .000 
Block 80.403 5 .000 
Model 80.403 5 .000 
 
 
Table 7 
Model 1 Logit Analysis Predicting UCDP Dyadic Armed Conflicts, 1989 – 2015 
 
 Table 7 reports the contribution of each variable in regression Model 1 towards 
predicting armed conflicts among states and between states and non-state actors in the UCDP’s 
dyadic dataset. Civilizational difference (CIVDIF) makes the largest unique contribution while 
third party military support (MILSUP) makes the least unique contribution per the Wald test (see 
column labelled Wald). Only the contributions of CIVDIF and national military capability 
(NACAPH) are statistically significant, p < 0.05. Geographical contiguity (GEOCON) contributes 
that barely misses the statistical significance level of 0.05. 
          Civilizational difference (CIVDIF) makes a significant contribution (p < 0.05), but in a 
direction opposite to the one forecasted in the clash thesis. While Huntington’s clash thesis links 
civilizational difference with increased likelihood of conflict, the coefficient for CIVDIF here is 
negative (as reported in the column of B values), meaning entities of different civilizations are 
less likely than entities of the same civilization, to fight each other, ceteris paribus. CIVDIF’s 
odds ratio suggests that, intercivilizational dyads are approximately 0.5 times less likely to 
engage in armed conflicts than intracivilizational dyads. The specified odds ratio is, however, 
only a point estimate at the true value, based on the sample data. Nevertheless, one can be 95 
percent confident that the actual value of the odds ratio for CIVDIF lies between 0.30 and 0.79, 
quite a small range of values. This confidence interval does not contain the value 1, ruling out 
               Variables         B        Wald          p      Odds Ratio      95% C.I. for Odds Ratio 
      Lower           Upper 
 
CIVDIF -.720 8.491 .004 .487 .300 .790 
GEOCON .396 3.484 .062 1.485 .980 2.251 
NACAPH 8.687 7.089 .008 5927.498 9.899 3549281.965 
DEMOCRACYL -.001 .010 .921 .999 .977 1.021 
MILSUP 20.308 .000 .996 660020751.955 .000 . 
Constant .617 9.344 .002 1.853   
 
16 
 
the possibility of the true odds ratio being 1 with equal armed conflict probability for both 
intercivilizational and intracivilizational dyads. 
          The above finding in Model 1, that intercivilizational dyads are less prone to armed 
conflicts than intracivilizational dyads, corroborates the negative correlations between 
civilizational difference and international conflict in major extant quantitative assessments of the 
clash thesis for the post-Cold War period by Russett, Oneal, and Cox (2000), Henderson and 
Tucker (2001), and Chiozza (2002). But as noted earlier, these studies test the civilizational 
effect on conflict exclusively from relationships between states, and their post-Cold War scope is 
limited. Nevertheless, upon adding relationships involving non-state actors to the evaluative 
design whilst stretching the temporal scope of extant analysis to cover almost the entire post-
Cold War period (1989-2015), this study finds evidence that, based on the Huntington’s 
geographically bound operationalization of civilizations, intracivilizational dyads are more prone 
to armed conflicts than intercivilizational dyads, holding other factors constant. The positive B 
coefficients on the realist control variables (geographical contiguity, military support, and 
national capability) and the negative coefficient on the liberal one (level of democracy) 
corroborate the directional patterns of correlations between these variables and armed conflict in 
extant peace research. 
 
Table 8 
Model 2 Logit Analysis Predicting UCDP Dyadic Armed Conflicts, 1989 – 2015 
                  Variables            B          Wald            p          Odds Ratio     95% C.I. for Odds Ratio 
        Lower            Upper 
 
CORECUL -.236 3.306 .069 .790 .612 1.019 
GEOCON .639 10.391 .001 1.894 1.284 2.793 
NACAPH 7.389 5.210 .022 1618.396 2.841 922084.765 
DEMOCRACYL -.002 .029 .864 .998 .976 1.020 
MILSUP 20.174 .000 .996 577151264.646 .000 . 
Constant .509 6.846 .009 1.663   
 
 
          To test the robustness of the finding linking civilizational similarity and increased armed 
conflict likelihood, another logistic regression analysis (Model 2) was executed whilst adopting a 
non-geographically bound operationalization of civilizational identity. Model 2 gauges 
civilization difference in terms of at least one member of the dyad perceiving and projecting the 
other as having a different core cultural identity (CORECUL), irrespective of geographical 
proximity. The robustness test model was statistically significant, χ2 (5, N = 1765) = 75.550,               
p < 0.05.  
          However, as reported in Table 8 above, while the negative direction of correlation between 
civilizational difference and armed conflicts in Model 2 (see CORECUL’s B coefficient) is the 
same as in Model 1 and opposite to the one forecasted by Huntington, the unique effect of 
CORECUL on the dependent variable marginally misses the level of statistical significance (p = 
17 
 
0.069 > 0.05). The range of values for which one can be 95 percent confident encompasses the 
actual value of the odds ratio for CORECUL (0.61 – 1.02) contains the value 1, meaning the true 
odds ratio could well be 1, with intercivilizational dyads being equally prone to armed conflicts 
as intracivilizational dyads. This does not corroborate the finding from Model 1, but it 
nevertheless disconfirms Huntington’s CoC thesis predicting intercivilizational dyads to be 
disproportionately prone to armed conflicts. 
Conclusion 
This study has substantially broadened and temporally extended the post-Cold War scope 
of major extant large-n evaluations of Huntington’s clash of civilizations (CoC) thesis by 
assessing the civilizational effect on conflictual interactions involving not only states but also 
interactions between states and non-state actors, from 1989 to 2015. Rather than a steady 
increase in intercivilizational and a steady decrease in intracivilizational armed conflicts, 
descriptive statistical analysis revealed volatility in the year-to-year distribution of 
intercivilizational and intracivilizational armed conflicts over the post-Cold War period. Two 
logistic regression tests incorporating geographical contiguity, military support, national 
capability, level of democracy was executed to gauge the effect of civilizational identity 
difference on armed conflict propensity. Using a geographically bound operationalization of 
civilizations, regression Model 1 found that, instead of increasing the likelihood of armed 
conflict as predicted in Huntington’s clash thesis, civilization difference appears to reduce armed 
conflict propensity. Regression Model 2 adopted a non-geographically bound operationalization 
of civilizations but found that intercivilizational dyads could be equally prone to armed conflicts 
as intracivilizational dyads, yet again disconfirming the clash thesis, albeit not statistically 
significantly.  
          The presence and absence of statistical significance in logistic regression outputs linking 
civilizational similarity and increased armed conflict propensity in Model 1 and Model 2 
respectively suggest a possibility that the validity or falsity of Huntington’s clash thesis could 
well vary depending on how conflict dyads are coded to be intercivilizational or not. But the 
absence of statistically significant evidence for a positive correlation between civilizational 
difference and armed conflict proclivity in both regression models in this study affirms extant 
quantitative evidence against the clash thesis (Russett, Oneal, & Cox, 2000; Henderson & 
Tucker, 2001; and Chiozza, 2002).  
          Critically, however, the UCDP dyadic dataset on which the clash thesis is tested does not 
incorporate dyads composed exclusively of non-state armed groups. Thus, although this study’s 
findings disconfirm the CoC thesis, they do not necessarily deny that civilizational or cultural 
factors, including ethnic and religious differences, might be at play in politics and conflicts 
involving non-state groups exclusively. Further assessments focusing on non-state actors and 
incorporating more realist and liberal control variables are required to provide more conclusive 
evidence regarding the civilizational effect on politics and conflicts in general. Nevertheless, to 
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the extent that Huntington’s thesis predicts armed clashes among states, and between states on 
the one hand and non-state armed groups on the other, it does not find empirical support in this 
study to justify it as a basis for states to adopt foreign policies of civilizational containment, 
involving, but not limited to, restrictions or absolute bans on immigration and refugee flows from 
other civilizations.                                                    
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